PG&E screwed up pretty bad prioritizing shareholder dividends over maintenance/vegetation management. That said, their potential exposure for liability feels something like the situation which led the the demise of small aircraft manufacturing in the US. The Western US is a tinderbox, partly by nature, partly by a century of a suppression only-approach to wildfires, made worse by an ever-increasing wildland-urban interface, and partly by warming/drying of the region associated with climate change. If a fire is not started by overhead lines, there are still plenty of other sources: grills, fireworks, dragging trailer chains, lighting strikes on dead snags. Reducing the incidence of the portion of fires due to overhead lines does not come cheap and comes with diminishing returns. There are technical and operational solutions: undergrounding, new circuit breakers that can detect arcing, preventative blackouts during high winds. But this requires money from somewhere and even a large investor owned utility probably won't have it after a large settlement.
PG&E reports ~$2B in profits per year. Southern California Edison's parent company, Edison International, reported a net income of ~$4.5B for 2025. Profits and management comp costs are funds that should be going into infrastructure investments. The electric company did not make the environment, but their for profit status directly competes with proper allocation of investment to defend against climate risk and build a resilient distribution network.
The California power grid should've been nationalized long ago as an electric cooperative, but there is no will, so this grift continues until it doesn't.
here's my take: it's convenient for politicians to fingerpoint and threaten IOUs in a state where wildfires are practically unavoidable (CC, veg, massive size). it works the base well, but they don't actually want the massive liability of wf risk running the state's Tx grid themselves. Especially not in a state with inverse condemnation. Esp not a gov that already bears too much risk via FAIR.
Gov will rarely actually push to even just reduce the ROR... even though they have that lever. I'm curious why you think this is. Not a gotcha or anything, I think there's lots of answers
Now, whether transitioning POUs to IOUs would serve ratepayers better (lower costs and reduced wildfires), I'm not sure there's a clear answer. If it were possible, I would vote on such a thing because I share your optimism. But I'm not sure I share your confidence. Options of equity financing etc can be helpful...
I want to make it clear im not an IOU apologist. I just think the whole system is broken, not just 1 (or i guess 3) actors.
Yeah, the problem with bringing all this stuff under direct government control is that it's REALLY expensive to keep it maintained for residents in wildfire prone areas.
SF is planning on buying out PG&E's assets, which will almost certainly reduce rates for SF customers and increase them for the rest of PG&E's base.
I think that CA could transition to the Texas model and take control of transmission while leaving generation to the market. If the state could properly assess transmission fees, it could guide future development away from wildfire areas and incentivize local generation where possible.
It would also drive down electricity prices and finally fix the embarrassing issue with "drill baby drill" TX doing better with renewables than CA.
PG&E screwed up pretty bad prioritizing shareholder dividends over maintenance/vegetation management. That said, their potential exposure for liability feels something like the situation which led the the demise of small aircraft manufacturing in the US. The Western US is a tinderbox, partly by nature, partly by a century of a suppression only-approach to wildfires, made worse by an ever-increasing wildland-urban interface, and partly by warming/drying of the region associated with climate change. If a fire is not started by overhead lines, there are still plenty of other sources: grills, fireworks, dragging trailer chains, lighting strikes on dead snags. Reducing the incidence of the portion of fires due to overhead lines does not come cheap and comes with diminishing returns. There are technical and operational solutions: undergrounding, new circuit breakers that can detect arcing, preventative blackouts during high winds. But this requires money from somewhere and even a large investor owned utility probably won't have it after a large settlement.
> That is not how democracy is supposed to work.
Eh. A system's purpose is what it does.
> paid by California families to Southern California Edison — whose equipment was investigated as the probable source of the Eaton Fire.
The electric company did not make Altadena a natural tinderbox. Nature did.
PG&E reports ~$2B in profits per year. Southern California Edison's parent company, Edison International, reported a net income of ~$4.5B for 2025. Profits and management comp costs are funds that should be going into infrastructure investments. The electric company did not make the environment, but their for profit status directly competes with proper allocation of investment to defend against climate risk and build a resilient distribution network.
The California power grid should've been nationalized long ago as an electric cooperative, but there is no will, so this grift continues until it doesn't.
https://www.pasadenanow.com/weekendr/edison-parent-reports-4...
https://www.electric.coop/electric-cooperative-fact-sheet
https://www.thebignewsletter.com/p/power-moves-how-electric-...
https://kevin.burke.dev/kevin/norcal-cities-new-utility/
> The California power grid should've been nationalized long ago as an electric cooperative, but there is no will
why do you think this is?
Politics.
ok, could you elaborate?
here's my take: it's convenient for politicians to fingerpoint and threaten IOUs in a state where wildfires are practically unavoidable (CC, veg, massive size). it works the base well, but they don't actually want the massive liability of wf risk running the state's Tx grid themselves. Especially not in a state with inverse condemnation. Esp not a gov that already bears too much risk via FAIR.
Gov will rarely actually push to even just reduce the ROR... even though they have that lever. I'm curious why you think this is. Not a gotcha or anything, I think there's lots of answers
Now, whether transitioning POUs to IOUs would serve ratepayers better (lower costs and reduced wildfires), I'm not sure there's a clear answer. If it were possible, I would vote on such a thing because I share your optimism. But I'm not sure I share your confidence. Options of equity financing etc can be helpful...
I want to make it clear im not an IOU apologist. I just think the whole system is broken, not just 1 (or i guess 3) actors.
Yeah, the problem with bringing all this stuff under direct government control is that it's REALLY expensive to keep it maintained for residents in wildfire prone areas.
SF is planning on buying out PG&E's assets, which will almost certainly reduce rates for SF customers and increase them for the rest of PG&E's base.
I think that CA could transition to the Texas model and take control of transmission while leaving generation to the market. If the state could properly assess transmission fees, it could guide future development away from wildfire areas and incentivize local generation where possible.
It would also drive down electricity prices and finally fix the embarrassing issue with "drill baby drill" TX doing better with renewables than CA.
I have to agree with you there.