Thanks! Have you considered evaluating the “AppClose” platform in a similar fashion? It is used in family / civil cases to my knowledge. Perhaps another worthwhile avenue of study, perhaps not. Thank you for your time.
It's interesting to me that other trackers have end-to-end encryption. I wouldn't have expected it but makes sense for the threat model.
> Providerslike Apple and Google achieve location indistinguishability by end-to-end encrypting location information using a public key embedded in BLE advertisements emitted by a tag
Though it makes me wonder... What's the private key? If the public key is attached to the tag, how is the device getting it? I'm guessing it gets shared during pairing.
Very cool! I only skimmed Section 4 a bit, but that's really cool!
I was going to ask how the web UIs possibly work if the location is indistinguishable, but I went to the Google Find Hub, and it appears you can't view the location for tags unless you enter your phone's pin code / pattern lock. This must either communicate with the phone or the keys are stored on Google's end.
EDIT: I turned my phone off, and I can still get the location of my keys... surely this doesn't mean the key is stored on their end? Wouldn't be very good E2EE in that case :)
AFAIK, there's a pre-shared key exchanged during pairing, and you then calculate keypairs based on (key, timestamp).
Rotating your keypairs in that way prevents attackers from identifying you across time. E.G. if they link a particular keypair to you — let's say at an Airport security gate — that doesn't let them know you've entered a lawyer's office a week later, because that's done under a different, unrelated public key.
I dont get why this is really an issue when there are devices on Temu you can easily buy that are actually designed for stalking. Why would anybody with a genuine nefarious purpose spend their time hacking a tile when they can just buy a generic Chinese gps transponder?
Generic GPS transponder (containing GPS receiver + some kind of data connection) will have limited battery life.
Systems like Tile, AirTag can last much longer with smaller battery and overall dimensions by offloading GPS and long data transmission to other devices. Strength(and dangers) of devices like this is in the size of tracking network not necessarily the hardware itself. Even better if you don't have to plant the tracker onto victim, because victim bought it and is intentionally carrying with themselves.
Criminals, particularly heavily disordered ones like stalkers, are usually not the smartest people in the world. So increasing the barrier of entry just a little bit might substantially decrease their practical access to this type of technology.
Suppose the person you want to stalk has bought a Tile that they use for themselves, not knowing that these devices are insecure. If you scan for that device, you can follow that person without even having to plant a device on them. You don't have to hack their Tile.
Because it serves a nefarious purpose: to smear the company that makes these devices. I would not be surprised if this is part of some kind of campaign designed to restrict or damage someone.
The text seems to support it to me, but more importantly "saying the title has a specific goal" isn't answering the question. Yes the title is calling out the company. What takes you from there to some kind of broader campaign.
I read the article. It absolutely does support the title. Unless you someone consider finger printable devices sending unencrypted location data somehow doesn't enable stalking
The article just say it's insecure, the title says that such security is a "feature for stalkers". I'm sorry, I don't see how insecurity makes it better for stalkers.
Does anyone know whether https://mygrid.app/ is trustworthy? Development had been glacial, but looking at their website it seems they finally support degoogled android which is a huge step forwards.
This explains why I'm seeing commercials for Life360 now for the first time ever: They've developed a new revenue stream by selling everybody's location to advertisers.
That was always the revenue stream, the devices were just a way to get you to give it to them. It's been a minute since I was current on who gets what in the HMD world but I think that data ultimately flows to Placer.ai
Life360 increases their marketing budget when they have a profitable way to sell user data so they can get the devices into the hands of more target users.
blog.adafruit.com
Performing security verification
This website uses a security service to protect against malicious bots. This page is displayed while the website verifies you are not a bot.
I never understood this. You can pass turnstile challenges on tor browser in a linux/windows VM, of all things. What unusual browser config are people using to trigger a block?
It's a flat plate of material, typically a ceramic square with decorative finish, arranged in regular patterns as a floor or wall surface in rooms expected to be exposed to water, where it is bonded to a substrate with cementitious adhesive.
There are plenty of times when you have to trust someone(s) else with your belongings, sometimes for a very long time - say, airline baggage, bus luggage compartment, hotel left luggage, or gym lockers - and it's useful to have a tracker (ideally a more secure one, e.g. AirTag) in case anything goes wrong.
And even if you're the type of person who never lets their bags leave their sight, nobody is immune to their keys slipping out of their pocket in a taxi.
I'm arguing the tradeoff of possible convenience isn't worth it.
Tile is owned by Life360. The original article talks about Life360 selling your data to advertisers. Let's look at what the Tile app wants to collect from you: photos and videos, location, app activity, messages, personal info. They say 'no data is shared with third parties'. Does that include the parent company Life360 that does sell data with third parties?
Last author on the paper here (https://arxiv.org/pdf/2510.00350). Happy to answer any questions!
Also, I'm just the professor, the grad students on it are the real heroes: Akshaya Kumar [1] and Anna Raymaker [2].
[1] https://akumar805.github.io/
[2] https://annaraymaker.dad/
Thanks! Have you considered evaluating the “AppClose” platform in a similar fashion? It is used in family / civil cases to my knowledge. Perhaps another worthwhile avenue of study, perhaps not. Thank you for your time.
Interesting! Hadn't heard of it.
It's interesting to me that other trackers have end-to-end encryption. I wouldn't have expected it but makes sense for the threat model.
> Providerslike Apple and Google achieve location indistinguishability by end-to-end encrypting location information using a public key embedded in BLE advertisements emitted by a tag
Though it makes me wonder... What's the private key? If the public key is attached to the tag, how is the device getting it? I'm guessing it gets shared during pairing.
In general, yes! We did some follow on work explaining how all of this works, depending on the provider: https://petsymposium.org/popets/2026/popets-2026-0113.pdf
Very cool! I only skimmed Section 4 a bit, but that's really cool!
I was going to ask how the web UIs possibly work if the location is indistinguishable, but I went to the Google Find Hub, and it appears you can't view the location for tags unless you enter your phone's pin code / pattern lock. This must either communicate with the phone or the keys are stored on Google's end.
EDIT: I turned my phone off, and I can still get the location of my keys... surely this doesn't mean the key is stored on their end? Wouldn't be very good E2EE in that case :)
The encryption key is derived from your PIN, it doesn't need to access the phone to do a new derivation.
AFAIK, there's a pre-shared key exchanged during pairing, and you then calculate keypairs based on (key, timestamp).
Rotating your keypairs in that way prevents attackers from identifying you across time. E.G. if they link a particular keypair to you — let's say at an Airport security gate — that doesn't let them know you've entered a lawyer's office a week later, because that's done under a different, unrelated public key.
Paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.00350
I dont get why this is really an issue when there are devices on Temu you can easily buy that are actually designed for stalking. Why would anybody with a genuine nefarious purpose spend their time hacking a tile when they can just buy a generic Chinese gps transponder?
Generic GPS transponder (containing GPS receiver + some kind of data connection) will have limited battery life.
Systems like Tile, AirTag can last much longer with smaller battery and overall dimensions by offloading GPS and long data transmission to other devices. Strength(and dangers) of devices like this is in the size of tracking network not necessarily the hardware itself. Even better if you don't have to plant the tracker onto victim, because victim bought it and is intentionally carrying with themselves.
In that case you have to plant the transponder yourself.
In the case of Tile, everyone using Tile has tagged themselves (unknowingly) for you.
The consumer who didn't know they tagged themselves would understandably have a complaint.
Criminals, particularly heavily disordered ones like stalkers, are usually not the smartest people in the world. So increasing the barrier of entry just a little bit might substantially decrease their practical access to this type of technology.
Suppose the person you want to stalk has bought a Tile that they use for themselves, not knowing that these devices are insecure. If you scan for that device, you can follow that person without even having to plant a device on them. You don't have to hack their Tile.
Because it serves a nefarious purpose: to smear the company that makes these devices. I would not be surprised if this is part of some kind of campaign designed to restrict or damage someone.
You went straight to conspiracy?
The title obviously has a slant, because the text of the article doesn't support it. So, yeah, I'm saying the title has a specific goal in mind.
The text seems to support it to me, but more importantly "saying the title has a specific goal" isn't answering the question. Yes the title is calling out the company. What takes you from there to some kind of broader campaign.
I read the article. It absolutely does support the title. Unless you someone consider finger printable devices sending unencrypted location data somehow doesn't enable stalking
The article just say it's insecure, the title says that such security is a "feature for stalkers". I'm sorry, I don't see how insecurity makes it better for stalkers.
Does anyone know whether https://mygrid.app/ is trustworthy? Development had been glacial, but looking at their website it seems they finally support degoogled android which is a huge step forwards.
This explains why I'm seeing commercials for Life360 now for the first time ever: They've developed a new revenue stream by selling everybody's location to advertisers.
Now deleted from my family's phones.
That was always the revenue stream, the devices were just a way to get you to give it to them. It's been a minute since I was current on who gets what in the HMD world but I think that data ultimately flows to Placer.ai
Not always. In the beginning it was supposed to be a freemium product, with all the revenue coming from subscriptions.
Whats the connection between an advertiser knowing your location, and ads from Life360?
Life360 increases their marketing budget when they have a profitable way to sell user data so they can get the devices into the hands of more target users.
"But, but, the Tile TOS says they'll fine a stalker a million dollars!"
Life360 is such a skeevy bullshit company.
BBP;DR (Broken Bot Protection; Didn't Read)
Loops forever at
blog.adafruit.com Performing security verification This website uses a security service to protect against malicious bots. This page is displayed while the website verifies you are not a bot.
I never understood this. You can pass turnstile challenges on tor browser in a linux/windows VM, of all things. What unusual browser config are people using to trigger a block?
I frequently see the problem on Android running Brave with default filters. Unsure on cause - I just give up.
I use a DPRK VPN
Is it actually in DPRK, or an unscrupulous operator that hosts the server outside DPRK, but hosts a puts fake information in the whois/geofeed?
It was a silly joke. I don't know of any provider real or take that offers North Korean IPs, and I suspect that roughly meets demand.
Passing the security verification succeeded for me (firefox on a mac, with ublock origin).
> Loops forever
And so it should, given:
> while the website verifies you are not a bot.
is impossible to complete.
What the hell is Tile?
cross-platform forerunner of the Apple AirTag
If AirTag is a CD, Tile is 8 track.
AirTag alternative
Thats what google is for.
It's a flat plate of material, typically a ceramic square with decorative finish, arranged in regular patterns as a floor or wall surface in rooms expected to be exposed to water, where it is bonded to a substrate with cementitious adhesive.
It isn't that difficult to just not lose things.
People love to over complicate their lives with technology, giving up money and privacy in the process.
There are plenty of times when you have to trust someone(s) else with your belongings, sometimes for a very long time - say, airline baggage, bus luggage compartment, hotel left luggage, or gym lockers - and it's useful to have a tracker (ideally a more secure one, e.g. AirTag) in case anything goes wrong.
And even if you're the type of person who never lets their bags leave their sight, nobody is immune to their keys slipping out of their pocket in a taxi.
I'm arguing the tradeoff of possible convenience isn't worth it.
Tile is owned by Life360. The original article talks about Life360 selling your data to advertisers. Let's look at what the Tile app wants to collect from you: photos and videos, location, app activity, messages, personal info. They say 'no data is shared with third parties'. Does that include the parent company Life360 that does sell data with third parties?
https://play.google.com/store/apps/datasafety?id=com.thetile...
Then use a better, more private tracker.